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NOTE
HARMONIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
ADEQUACY RULES FOR SECURITIES
FIRMS: AN ARGUMENT TO IMPLEMENT
THE VALUE AT RISK APPROACH BY
ADOPTING BASLE'S INTERNAL MODEL
METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
Capital adequacy has been defined as the "extent of capital
that should be required of brokers or others carrying on the
business of trading in securities."' Regulatory capital require-
ments "protect customers or depositors" and contribute to "the
stability of financial markets to which they apply by limiting
firm failures and resulting losses to customers, depositors, or
other firms."' While global banking supervisors have been
successful in obtaining international capital adequacy stan-
dards, global securities regulators have failed to accomplish
this goal. There are three reasons which may explain this
regulatory failure. In the past, the traditional separation be-
tween banking and securities in the United States and Japan
has impeded any regulatory harmonization with institutions
who are constituents of a universal banking regulatory re-
gime.3 Two, since securities markets compete against one an-
1. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAw § 27.72 (2d ed. 1998).
2. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON
BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, AND THE CHAIRMAN, COM-
MITTEE ON BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RISK-
BASED CAPITAL: REGULATORY AND INDUSTRY APPROACHES TO CAPITAL AND RISK,
GAO/GGD 98-153, at 4 (1998) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
3. Joseph J. Norton, Structuring the Banking Regulators and Supervisors: De-
veloped Country Experiences and Their Possible Implications for Latin America and
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other, there is an incentive not to cooperate with their regu-
latory colleagues because "such cooperation might undermine
their country's competitive position in the international mar-
kets."4 However, by adhering to this competitive position, the
regulator may operate to the "detriment of [its] country's inter-
ests."5 Three, the Securities & Exchange Commission's (SEC)
"predominant doctrinal approach" to international securities
regulation has been "unilateral."' Thus, the "hallmark of this
unilateral approach" has been the SEC's "extraterritorial appli-
cation of American laws to foreign issues, whether they involve
foreign companies, foreign transactors, or any other foreign
element."7 Therefore, the unilateral approach may impede any
attempt to "harmonize" regulations when one key regulator
compromises only by applying its national securities laws.
While these reasons may explain the failure of internation-
al securities regulators to implement a global capital adequacy
requirement, this paper will argue for the need for uniform
international capital adequacy standards for securities firms.
To effect a harmonization of international capital adequacy
rules, global securities regulators should implement the Value
at Risk (VAR) Approach by adopting the Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision's (BASLE) internal model methodology.
Part I will discuss: (a) background of capital standards devel-
oped by BASLE,' (b) different approaches to capital adequacy,
(c) attempts at global harmonization by the International Or-
Other Developing Countries, 4 NAFTA. L. & Bus. REV. AM. 5, 17 (1998). However,
the Glass-Steagall Act has since been repealed. See Clinton Signs Legislation Over-
hauling Banking Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1999, at C3; President Clinton Signs
Financial-Services Reform Bill, BEsTWIRE, Nov. 12, 1999, available in LEXIS,
News Library, UPI File. The act that dismantles the Glass-Steagall Act, is the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Financial Modernization Act of 1999. See Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102 [hereinafter Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act].
4. Amir N. Licht, Games Commissions Play: 2 x2 Games of International Secu-
rities Regulation, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 61, 64 (1999).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 66.
7. Id.
8. The Committee consists of senior representatives of bank supervisory au-
thorities and central banks from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the
United States. See The Bank for International Settlements, Profile of an Interna-
tional Organisation (visited Jan. 16, 1999) <http://www.bis.orgfabouttprof-gh.htm>.
However, the Group of Ten includes all of the aforementioned countries except
Luxembourg. See id.
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ganization of Securities Commissions9 (IOSCO), and (d) recent
changes to the securities laws by the SEC. Part II will explore
the reasons why capital adequacy rules should be harmonized.
Part III presents the recommendation for global securities
regulators to implement the VAR approach by adopting
BASLE's internal model methodology.
I. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO CAPITAL ADEQUACY
Bank and securities regulators currently employ several
different approaches to capital adequacy. BASLE developed the
global capital adequacy requirements for banks. BASLE first
implemented the building block approach by developing the
standardized methodology. After the advent of VAR risk man-
agement, BASLE also developed the internal model methodolo-
gy. Even though the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) adopted
BASLE's internal model methodology for capital adequacy, it
has recently been testing an alternative method, the Pre-Com-
mitment Approach (PCA). While European Union (EU) banks
and securities firms employ BASLE's methodology, the SEC
insists on the stringent comprehensive approach. The SEC's
insistence may explain why IOSCO failed to obtain a uniform
global capital adequacy requirement for securities firms. How-
ever, when the SEC promulgated the Over the Counter (OTC)
Derivatives Dealers rule, it conceded that harmonization may
be necessary to allow the U.S. capital markets to be competi-
tive.
A. The Background of the BASLE Accord
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is a commit-
tee of the Bank of International Settlements, an organization
founded to "foster international financial stability" and serves
as an "important forum for international monetary and finan-
cial cooperation between central bankers."" In July 1988,
9. The Technical Committee of IOSCO is a committee of supervisory authori-
ties for securities firms. It includes senior representatives of Australia, France,
Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Canada (Ontario &
Quebec), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. See
International Organization of Securities Commissions, Trading and Derivatives
Disclosures of Banks and Securities Firm, Results of the Survey of Public Disclo-
sures in 1998 Annual Reports (visited Feb. 12, 2000) <http://www.iosco.orgdocs-
public/1999-derivatives-disclosures-document05.html>.
10. The Bank for International Settlements, supra note 8.
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representatives of bank supervisory authorities from twelve
countries meeting in Basle, Switzerland, agreed to uniform
capital requirements as reflected in the "Basle Accord on Inter-
national Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards."" BASLE developed a "framework for assessing
an institution's capital adequacy by weighing its assets and off-
balance sheet exposures on the basis of counterparty credit
risk."2 One of the "articulated purposes" of the Capital Guide-
lines was to "achieve greater consistency in the evaluation of
the capital adequacy of major banks throughout the world.""
The Capital Guidelines apply a risk weighting to different
categories of on and off balance sheet assets, and compare each
institution's total risk adjusted assets to total qualifying capi-
tal.' In early 1989, the FRB implemented the "Final Risk-
Based Capital Guidelines for State Member Banks and Bank
Holding Companies." 5 In the early 1990s, BASLE recognized
the need to develop risk management principals for market
[T]he Basle Committee on Banking Supervision... encompasses three
main areas. Firstly, the Committee provides a forum for discussion on
the handling of specific supervisory problems. Secondly, it coordinates the
sharing of supervisory responsibilities among national authorities in re-
spect of banks' foreign establishments with the aim of ensuring effective
supervision of banks' activities worldwide . . . . Thirdly, it seeks to en-
hance standards of supervision, notably in relation to solvency, so as to
help strengthen the soundness and stability of international bank-
ing .... The best known of these is the agreement in 1988 to achieve
international convergence in the measurement of the adequacy of banks'
capital and to establish minimum capital standards.
Id.
11. Daniel P. Cunningham, U.S. Regulation of Dealers in OTC Derivatives, in
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETs 281, 284 (1994) (citing Federal Reserve Sys-
tems, Capital Adequacy Guidelines for State Member Banks: Risk Based Measure,
12 C.F.R. ch.11, pt. 208, app. A (1989)). The purpose of the measure is to:
i. Make regulatory capital requirements more sensitive to differences
in risk profiles among banks,
ii. Factor off balance sheet exposures into the assessment of capital
adequacy,
iii. Minimize disincentives to holding liquid, low risk assets, and
iv. Achieve greater consistency in the evaluation of the capital ade-
quacy of major banks throughout the world.
Id.
12. Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk, 61 Fed. Reg. 47,358 (1996)
[hereinafter Market Risk].
13. Federal Reserve Systems, Capital Adequacy Guidelines for State Member
Banks: Risk-Based Measure, 12 C.F.R. ch. 11, pt. 208, app. A, iv (1989).
14. See Cunningham, supra note 11, at 283-284.
15. Id.
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risks. Banks and securities firms are exposed to market risks
through their trading activities. 6 Market risk is the "poten-
tial for financial losses due to the increase or decrease in the
value or price of an asset resulting from broad movements in
prices, such as interest rates, commodity prices, stock prices, or
the relative value of currencies (foreign exchange)." Because
all financial firms hold assets, they all encounter market
risks. 8 However, they may not all encounter all types of mar-
ket risks. 9 Market risk occurs when the price of an equity
security declines based upon concerns regarding the financial
performance of the corporate issuer," or when a fixed income
security declines in value based upon a change in interest
rates.2 '
In January 1996, the world's twelve major financial cen-
ters as members of the BIS signed the Basle Accord to Incorpo-
rate Market Risk. In order to manage market risk by setting
regulatory capital requirements for trading positions, BASLE
used the building block approach and the VAR approach to
develop two alternative methodologies. The building block
approach assigns "risk charges to specific instruments and
specifies how these charges must be aggregated into an overall
market risk capital requirement."2' Based on the building
block approach, BASLE developed its standardized methodolo-
gy which established fixed risk charges and mandatory cal-
culations to ascertain a bank's regulatory capital requirement.
As an alternative to the building block approach's fixed capital
charges, the VAR approach allows a bank's internal risk mea-
surement model to produce potential loss estimates. Based
16. See HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, TRANS-
ACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 252 (6th ed. 1999).
17. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 16, at 254.
21. See id.
22. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Amendment to the Capital
Accord to Incorporate Market Risks (last modified Sept. 1997)
<http-//www.bis.org/publ/bcbs24a.htm> [hereinafter BASLE Accord].
23. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, The Pre-Commitment Approach:
Using Incentives to Set Market Risk Capital Requirements, in FED. RESERVE
BOARD, FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES 3 (1997).
24. See id. VAR refers to the following: 1) the risk management philosophy of
computing the maximum possible loss through modeling techniques in an
20001
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upon the VAR approach, BASLE developed its internal model
methodology which allows banks to use their proprietary mod-
els to measure capital provided that the model satisfies mini-
mum standards and receives the national banking regulator's
approval.' In its 1996 proposal, BASLE determined that a
bank would be permitted to choose between the standardized
methodology and the internal model methodology.
26
B. Approaches to Market Risk
1. The Building Block Approach-BASLE's Standardized
Methodology
The BASLE Committee first developed the standardized
methodology for measuring market risks based upon the build-
ing block approach.2 ' The building block approach sets capital
requirements by isolating broad classes of risk such as interest
rate, equity position, foreign exchange and commodities risk.28
Each category of risk is attributed a "separately calculated
charge."29 The specific risk applies to each security whether
"it is a short or long position."0 Specific risk reflects the
changes in the market value of an institution's individual hold-
ings such as the creditor risk of an instrument's issuer.3 The
general market risk charge applies to each security and the
"long and short positions in different securities can be off-
set."32 General market risk reflects changes associated "with
global capital markets or world economies."33 These broad
market movements may -affect the general level of interest
rates, equity prices, foreign exchange rates and commodity
prices.34 The total capital requirement reflects the sum of
institution's portfolio, and 2) the actual maximum possible loss. I have attempted
to distinguish the different meanings of VAR by referring to BASLE's interpreta-
tion of VAR as the "internal model methodology." Id.
25. See BASLE Accord, supra note 22, at 44.
26. See id. at 3.
27. See Scorr & WELLONS, supra note 16, at 259.
28. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 94.
29. BASLE Accord, supra note 22, at 9.
30. Id.
31. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 50.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 49 n.18.
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both general and specific risk.35 For example, using the stan-
dardized methodology for equity position risk, a liquid and
well-diversified portfolio will have a specific capital charge of
4%. Otherwise, the capital charge will be 8%."6 The general
market risk charge for equity is 8%."
The EU issued the Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD)
"nearly contemporaneously" with the BASLE proposal. 8 The
CAD espoused the same building block approach and standard-
ized methodology as BASLE.39 The CAD attempted to create a
"level playing field" for both securities firms and banks by
treating banks' securities portfolios and securities firms' pro-
prietary positions in the same manner.40 Furthermore, the
CAD attempted to harmonize the rules regulating banks and
securities firms in EU countries to stabilize the EU market.4'
The major difference between CAD and BASLE is the selection
of equity capital charges for specific risks. The CAD provides a
2% capital charge for diversified and liquid portfolios and a 4%
capital charge for undiversified and illiquid portfolios.
42
While both BASLE and the EU adopted the building block
approach, strong criticism of this approach propelled the FRB
to abandon it as an alternative to the internal model meth-
35. See id. at 51.
36. See id.
37. See BASLE Accord, supra note 22, at 19.
38. See Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, The Ongoing Process of
International Bank Regulatory and Supervisory Convergence: A New Regulatory-
Market "Partnership," 16 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 227, 299 (1997).
39. See Council Directive 93/6, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 1 [hereinafter CAD]. Prior to
the CAD, UK regulators utilized the portfolio approach to regulating capital ade-
quacy. See ScoTr & WELLONS, supra note 16, at 267. This approach "lowers capi-
tal requirements as a portfolio of securities becomes increasingly balanced in long
and short positions and increasingly diversified." Id. The portfolio approach recog-
nizes how by "netting long and short positions in the same stock, which hedges
market risk, and by determining the extent to which a portfolio is diversified." Id.
at 268. The residual risk, is the "function of each security's share in the portfolio
and the relationship between returns on each security in the portfolio." Id. Since
the parameters for a portfolio for 2000 stocks may be extensive, the cost to imple-
ment the theory was great. See id. Thus, the UK regulators simplified the param-
eters. This method of calculating capital requires less capital than the building
block approach. See id.
40. See Nancy Worth, Harmonizing Capital Adequacy Rules for International
Banks and Securities Firms, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 133, 170 (1992).
41. See Norton & Olive, supra note 38, at 300.
42. See Scowi' & WELLONS, supra note 16, at 260; CAD, supra note 39.
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odology.43 In the FRB's concept release proposing both the
standardized methodology and the internal model methodology,
"several commentaries expressed concerns about the accuracy
of the standardized approach and urged for its elimination."44
These critics of the internal model methodology believed that
"inaccurate estimates of the risk exposures" could lead to re-
duced "economic efficiency by distorting banks' investment
decisions and creating incentives for unproductive regulatory
arbitrage activities." 5 In the final rule, the U.S. banking
agencies stated that they "concur with commentaries that an
institution with significant exposure to market risk can most
accurately measure that risk using the detailed information
available to the institution about its particular portfolio pro-
cessed by its own risk measurement model." 6 By abandoning
the building block approach, the FRB acknowledged that "no
single or specific technique is best for everyone."47 Another
major criticism of the building block approach involved its
treatment of derivatives. The building block approach (as well
as the internal model methodology) does not account for net-
ting arrangements and relies upon notional values which
makes it ill suited for derivative positions.4" Therefore, the
enormous growth of derivatives also propelled the development
of a risk management approach (VAR) that could handle deriv-
ative positions.49
2. The VAR Approach and BASLE's Internal Model
Methodology
The VAR approach represents an estimate of the maxi-
mum amount by which the value of an "institution's positions
could decline due to general market movements during a fixed
holding period, measured with a specific confidence level.""0
43. See Market Risk, supra note 12, at 47,362.
44. Kupiec & O'Brien, supra note 23, at 2.
45. Id.
46. Market Risk, supra note 12, at 47,362.
47. Susan M. Phillips & Alan N. Rechtschaffen, International Banking Activi-
ties: The Role of the Federal Reserve Bank in Domestic Capital Markets, 21
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1754, 1757 (1998).
48. See KEVIN DOWD, BEYOND VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW SCIENCE OF RISK
MANAGEMENT 226 (1998).
49. See id. at 8. Dowd argues that the growth of derivatives instruments was
one of the reasons for the development of VAR risk management. Id.
50. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 50. The holding period is the period of rate
228 [Vol. XXVI:1
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The VAR approach permits the use of various modeling tech-
niques such as the variance-covariance matrices, historical
simulations or Monte Carlo simulations.5' Based upon the
VAR approach, BASLE developed the internal model methodol-
ogy.52 However, BASLE set specific minimum standards for
each institution's internal model.53
The BASLE Committee set minimum qualitative require-
ments for the internal model methodology. Supervisors would
authorize banks based on the following: an active independent
risk control unit with actively involved directors and senior
managers, a model closely integrated to daily risk manage-
ment, regular stress tests for exceptional plausible conditions,
thorough compliance procedures, and regular internal review
by the bank's internal audit unit.54 The qualitative standards
would ensure that the VAR models are "conceptually sound
and implemented with integrity."55
BASLE also required quantitative requirements to ensure
that the "capital charges are sufficiently consistent with insti-
tutions with similar exposures." 5 While the standardized
methodology applies fixed capital charges for each risk catego-
ry," the internal model methodology calculates the required
capital charge as a "conservative estimate of possible losses
due to market volatility."5 The internal model methodology
specifies common parameters such as: daily calculation of VAR,
assumed holding period of 10 days, a 99% confidence level, the
use of empirically verified correlation between and across risk
types, and the use of one year of historic data, with data up-
dated every three months.59 Thus, the computation for the
and price movements upon which the model is based. The confidence level refers
to the specific probability of the profit and loss distribution occurring, thus a 99%
confidence level means that the VAR estimate covers all but the largest 1% of
losses. See DOWD, supra note 48, at 39.
51. See DOWD, supra note 48, at table of contents. See also BASLE Accord,
supra note 22, at 44.
52. See generally Norton & Olive, supra note 38, at 303.
53. BASLE Accord, supra note 22, at 38, 39.
54. See id; Federal Reserve Systems, Capital Adequacy Guidelines for State
Member Banks; Market Risk Measure, 12 C.F.R. ch. 11, pt. 208, app. E § 4(b);
Council Directive 98/33, 1998 O.J. (L 204) (amending Directive 93/6).
55. BASLE Accord, supra note 22, at 39.
56. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 51.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 51 n.22.
59. See BASLE Accord, supra note 22, at 44. "The supervisory authority may
22920001
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VAR would be the previous day's value at risk and the average
daily value at risk of the preceding sixty days multiplied by a
minimum multiplier of three.0 BASLE participants believed
that "modeling oversimplifies volatilities" because "VAR esti-
mates use end-of-day positions and miss intra-day trading
risk" causing models to miss "exceptional circumstances.""
The internal model methodology requires that institutions
multiply the VAR by three or more "to adjust for these short-
comings."62
The internal model methodology also requires that the
internal model contaqn an appropriate set of general market
risk factors such as interest rates, equity prices, exchange
rates and commodity prices, and the specific "market rates and
prices that affect the value of the bank's trading positions."63
Institutions must also have a "rigorous and comprehensive
stress testing program" to "identify events or influences that
could greatly impact" their portfolios.6' The internal model
methodology sets out how the stress test should be conducted:
to cover extraordinary losses and gains, quantitative and quali-
tative in nature, and "combine the use of supervisory stress
scenarios with stress tests developed banks themselves."65
In August 1996, U.S. bank regulators amended their capi-
tal standards with measures for market risk based largely on
the internal model methodology recommended by the BASLE
Committee." The new rules took effect January 1, 1997.67 As
also recognise empirical correlations across broad risk factor categories, provided
that the supervisory authority is satisfied that the bank's system for measuring
correlations is sound and implemented with integrity." Id.
60. See id. at 55.
61. 12 C.F.R. ch. 11, pt. 208, app. E § 2(d).
62. Id. at tbl. 1.
63. BASLE Accord, supra note 22, at 42. For example:
[Flor interest rates, there must be a set of factors corresponding to inter-
est rates for each currency in which the bank has interest-rate-sensitive
on or off-balance sheet positions. The risk measurement system should
model the yield curve using one of a number of generally accepted ap-
proaches, for example, by estimating forward rates of zero coupon
yields .. .. The risk measurement system must incorporate separate risk
factors to capture the spread risk.
Id.
64. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. See Federal Reserve Systems, Capital Adequacy Guidelines for State Mem-
ber Banks; Market Risk Measure, 12 C.F.R. ch. 11, pt. 208, app. E § 1(a) n.1
(1996). Note 1 acknowledges BASLE's role in this regulation:
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permitted by the BASLE Accord, the FRB permitted only the
internal model methodology to be used.68
The EC did not reach political agreement regarding the
internal model methodology until December 1997 (CAD II).69
This appendix is based on a framework developed jointly by supervisory
authorities from the countries represented on the BASLE Committee on
Banking Supervision and endorsed by the Group of Ten Central Bank
Governors. The framework is described in a BASLE Committee paper
entitled "Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks,"
January 1996.
Id.
67. See id. The purpose section states the general application of the regula-
tion.
The U.S. capital adequacy requirements apply to any bank or bank hold-
ing company whose trading activity equals 10 percent or more of its total
assets or whose trading activity equals $1 billion or more. In addition, a
bank regulator can include an institution that does not meet the criteria
if deemed necessary for safety and soundness purposes or can exclude
institutions that meet the applicability criteria.
Id. § 1(b).
68. See id. However, the banking agencies recently changed the calculations
for specific risk so that all aspects of the internal model's methodology would
utilize the bank's internal model. When the agencies initially adopted the market
risk rules, an institution using its internal model to measure specific risk was
required to hold capital for specific risk equal to at least 50 percent of the specific
risk charge calculated using the standardized approach (minimum specific risk
charge). If a portion of the institution's VAR attributable to specific risk did not
equal the minimum specific risk charge, the institution's VAR based capital charge
was subject to an add on charge of the difference between the two. In practice,
this required an institution employing an internal model to measure specific risk
to also calculate the specific risk charge using a standardized approach. When the
agencies included the minimum specific risk charge as part of the market risk
rules, they recognized that dual calculations of specific risk-that is, calculating
specific risk with internal models as well as using the standardized approach to
establish the minimum specific risk charge-would be burdensome. However, the
agencies' decision to include the minimum specific risk charge was consistent with
the Basle Committee's belief that a minimum charge was necessary to ensure that
modeling techniques for specific risk adequately measured that risk. After the
Basle Committee adopted the market risk amendment, many institutions improved
their modeling techniques and, in particular, their modeling of specific risk. Recog-
nizing these improvements in September 1997 the Basle Committee decided to
eliminate the use of the minimum specific risk charge and the burden of a sepa-
rate calculation. The Basle Committee revised the market risk amendment so that
an institution using a valid internal model to measure specific risk could use the
VAR measures generated by the model without comparing the model-generated
results to the minimum specific risk charge calculated under the standardized
approach. The revisions specified that the specific risk elements of such models
through backtesting and review by the relevant agency. See Risk-Based Capital
Standards: Market Risk, 64 Fed. Reg. 19,034, 19,035 (1999).
69. See ScOTr & WELLONS, supra note 16, at 276.
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On June 22, 1998, the EC passed CAD II to allow institutions
to develop "their own risk-management systems (internal mod-
els) designed to measure more accurately than the standard-
ized m thod the market risks incurred by investment firms
and credit institutions."70
The major criticism of BASLE's internal model methodolo-
gy has been the 3x multiplier applied to the VAR. In a General
Accounting Office (GAO) study, several bankers commented
that the new requirement requires "unrealistic levels of capital
due to the multipliers imposed on the bank's internal mod-
el."71 While weighing the pros and cons of the multiplier ap-
proach, an IOSCO study remarked that the multiplier may
"encourage firms that would otherwise take a conservative
approach to calculating VAR to be less conservative in order to
reduce the impact of the multiplier."72 Therefore, the multipli-
er could create a "perverse incentive to design a model to mini-
mize the regulatory effects rather than optimize its use as a
risk management tool."' Thus, the particular multiplier "is
open to the charge that it is arbitrary."74 One commentator
even referred to the multiplier as the "hysteria factor."75 De-
scribed as "pulled out of thin air," the commentator alleges
that "industry legend" claims that the number arose as a "com-
promise between U.S. regulatory authorities who wanted a
multiplier of one and German authorities who wanted a multi-
plier of five."76 Finally, industry participants have observed
that the models are "limited by the quality of the data avail-
able, the computation power available, and the ability of ana-
lysts to develop mathematical models to accurately reflect
financial risks and returns as economic conditions change."77
Regulators have echoed this concern regarding the "depend-
ability of the results from the firms' risk measurement sys-
tems, in terms of the accuracy of the results and the transpar-
70. Council Directive 93/31, 1998 O.J. (L 204) 13 (amending Directive 93/6).
71. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 69.
72. TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURI-
TIES COMMISSIONS, METHODOLOGIES FOR DETERMINING MINIMUM CAPITAL STAN-
DARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY ACTIVE SECURITIES FIRMS WHICH PERMIT THE USE OF
MODELS UNDER PRESCRIBED CONDITIONS 12 (1998).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. DOWD, supra note 48, at 213.
76. Id.
77. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 82.
232 [Vol. XXV:I
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ency in the firms' use of internal models." 8
3. The VAR Approach-Pre-Commitment Approach
In response to a perceived high level of capital required by
the internal model methodology, some regulators have ex-
pressed concerns regarding the bank's incentive to implement
accurate internal models.79 Due to this concern, the FRB pro-
posed an alternative to the internal model methodology, the
Pre-Commitment Approach (PCA).8" The PCA would provide
"an explicit incentive mechanism for committing adequate
capital to cover a level of market risk that is known only to the
bank."8 Using the bank's proprietary model to develop its
value at risk in its trading portfolio, the PCA allows banks "to
pre-coimit to a maximum loss exposure."82 Under the PCA,
the bank would "specify an amount of capital it believed was
adequate to cover its risk exposure over a fixed subsequent
interval and would commit to manage its trading portfolio to
limit losses over the interval to this amount."83 If the bank's
losses exceed the pre-comnmitted amount, the bank would "face
penalties that could range from public disclosure to additional
capital requirements or monetary fines."" This maximum loss
pre-commitment would be the bank's market risk capital
charge rather than developing the capital charge through the
internal model methodology.85 Several representatives of the
U.S. bank regulatory agencies have cited the PCA as a pro-
posed method because it provides banks with an "incentive" to
establish the capital adequacy level in a "prudent fashion."88
78. Id. at 97.
79. See Kupiec & O'Brien, supra note 23, at 3.
80. See id. at 31.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 110.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See Phillips & Rechtschaffen, supra note 47, at 1756. See also Jill
Considine, Pilot Exercise-Pre-Commitment Approach to Market Risk, 4 FED. RE-
SERVE BANK N.Y. ECON. POLY R. (Oct. 1998). Ten banking organizations partici-
pated in a pilot for this approach to capital requirements for market risks. They
were: BankAmerica Corp., Bankers Trust New York Corp., Chase Manhattan
Corp., Citicorp, First Chicago NBD Corp., First Union Corp., Fuji Bank Ltd., JP
Morgan & Co., NationsBank Corp., and Swiss Bank Corp. See id. The Pilot dem-
onstrated that the Pre-Commitment Approach "is a viable alternative to the inter-
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The PCA may be criticized for its counterproductive impact
on banks during stressful market conditions." In addition, an
"appropriate penalty" must present an adequate deterrent to
future unlawful activity." Therefore, the penalty must be
"bank specific" and "depends on characteristics that regulators
cannot precisely measure."89 Finally, the PCA also assumes a
"forward looking" reaction to "potential penalties."" Weak
banks may not be deterred by "future penalties that, in the
extreme, might not be enforceable if the bank is insolvent."91
4. The Comprehensive Approach
The SEC's approach to capital requirements (comprehen-
sive approach) reflects its "emphasis on customer protection" to
ensure that "broker-dealers have adequate liquid assets to
meet their obligations to investors and creditors."2 The SEC
protects the "liquidation value" of the firm rather than "going
concern" valuation.93 The SEC's Net Capital Rule (15c3-1)
computes capital as "net worth" less deductions (haircuts) for
securities positions "minus non-liquid assets, like buildings,
plus certain subordinated debt."' Haircuts are "designed to
provide protection from the market risk, credit risk, and other
risks inherent in various positions."95 Securities are valued at
market price (marked to market). The theory behind the hair-
nal model approach for establishing the capital adequacy of a trading business for
regulatory purposes." Id. "The Participating Institutions believe that the results of
the Pilot suggest that the 3x multiplier, as well as the specific risk component,
even after the Basle Committee's revision dated September 17, 1997, lead to exces-
sive regulatory capital requirements for their trading positions." Id. (emphasis
added). None of the ten institutions reported a negative P&L in excess of its pre-
committed capital. See id. However, the Pilot conceded that during the period that
the institutions tested the PCA, the market maintained moderate volatility. See id.
87. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 111.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. ScoTT & WELLONS, supra note 16, at 263; See also Norton & Olive, supra
note 38, at 307 (referring to 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1).
93. SCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 263.
94. Worth, supra note 40, at 147 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1).
95. SEC, Concept Release, Net Capital Rule, No. 34-39456, File S7-32-97 (Dec.
17, 1997) (visited Oct. 25, 1999) <http'//www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-39456.txt>
(proposing an amendment to 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1) [hereinafter Net Capital
Rule].
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cuts is that by discounting the value of a broker-dealer's pro-
prietary positions, a capital cushion will be provided in case
the value of the broker-dealer's portfolio declines. 6 There are
two types of financial ratio computations specified: (1) an "ag-
gregate indebtedness standard" which generally prohibits the
broker or dealer from permitting its aggregate indebtedness to
exceed 1500% of its net capital and (2) an "alternative stan-
dard" which requires that a broker not permit its net capital to
be less then the greater of $250,000 or 2% of aggregate debit
items to be computed under the rule. 7 A broker dealer who
carries customer accounts must also maintain net capital of
not less than $250,000.8 The SEC also has rules that require
the segregation of customer funds from firms' funds.99 The
SEC rule complements the Net Capital Rule and is designed to
prevent the misallocation or misuse of customer funds and
securities.'
As conceded by the SEC, the critical weakness of the com-
prehensive approach is its failure to recognize several "speci-
fied hedging activities" and "historical correlations between
foreign securities and U.S. securities" or "between equity secu-
rities and debt securities."'' By failing to recognize these off-
sets, the haircut method "may cause firms with large, diverse
96. See id. Thus, the Rule "requires a broker dealer to compute its haircuts
by multiplying the market value of its securities positions by prescribed percentag-
es." Id. at 3.
For example, a broker-dealer's haircut for equity securities is equal to 15
percent of the market value of the greater of the long or short equity
position plus 15 percent of the market value of the lesser position, but
only to the extent this position exceeds 25 percent of the greater posi-
tion. In contrast to the uniform haircut for equity securities, the haircuts
for several types of interest rate sensitive securities, such as government
securities, are directly related to the time remaining until the particular
security matures. The Rule uses a sliding scale of haircut percentages
with these securities because changes in interest rates will usually have
a greater impact on the price of securities with longer remaining maturi-
ties compared to those securities with shorter remaining maturities.
Id.
97. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 692-93 (8th ed.
1998) (citing rule 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1)(i) & (ii)).
98. See id. (citing rule 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(2)(i)).
99. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 61 (citing rule 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
100. See id.
101. Net Capital Rule, supra note 95, at 12.
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portfolios to reserve capital that actually overcompensates for
market risk.""2
C. Failure of IOSCO
Based upon the success of BASLE and the divergent capi-
tal adequacy requirements between the United States and EU
securities firms, IOSCO1 3 accelerated its efforts to coordinate
its positions on capital adequacy with other international regu-
latory authorities in the 1990s. ' In 1993, IOSCO's Technical
Committee indicated to BASLE that "it would adopt the build-
ing block approach to capital adequacy.""°5 The SEC also in-
dicated that it would not "oppose this approach as a minimum
standard but would retain its current Net Capital Rule for
equities which would require a higher standard.""6
However, at a subsequent meeting, SEC Chairman Rich-
ard Breeden called IOSCO's -proposal "highly unsafe." 7 This
"notable battle" pitted the SEC Chairman against the other
members of IOSCO, primarily the European countries.0 8 The
disagreement involved how the haircut should be applied to
equity securities in a securities firm's portfolio when calculat-
ing the net capital.' 9 Chairman Breeden believed that the
building block approach espoused by BASLE and IOSCO
"would result in a significant weakening of the protection
against insolvency of securities firms.""0 According to one
102. Id. In the GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 69, industry officials stated that
"the current net capital rule does not deal well with hedging or other risk reduc-
ing strategies which are based on price volatility and correlation." The 100% hair-
cut rule can only "allow limited types of hedges without becoming unreasonably
complicated." Id.
103. See IOSCO, supra note 9.
104. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 1, § 27.72.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See A. A. Summer, Jr., IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement, 17 NW. J.
INT'L & Bus. 15, 25 (1997). See also Jane C. Kang, The Regulation of Global Fu-
tures Markets: Is Harmonization Possible or Even Desirable?, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 242 (1997).
109. See Kang, supra note 108, at 242.
110. Id. See also ScOTT & WELLONS, supra note 16, at 261. Apparently, Chair-
man Breeden suggested that the BASLE Committee was "partially responsible for
the recession in the early 1990s." David Zaring, International Law by Other
Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations,
33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 281, 283 (1998).
2000] SECURITIES HARMONIZATION 237
commentator, "the SEC's refusal to endorse the standards pro-
posed by IOSCO has harmed the organization severely."'
IOSCO has not achieved any regulatory success in implement-
ing global capital adequacy standards for securities firms."
Therefore, the efforts of banking and securities regulators
toward regulatory convergence in the area of market risk man-
agement have been described as "unbalanced.""' IOSCO
abandoned its effort to harmonize these standards and has
focused on supervisory reports for securities firms and regula-
tors." IOSCO recently published a study "to provide guid-
ance to those supervisors which have decided in principle that
VAR models for market risk have a part to play in their regu-
latory framework."" 5 However, IOSCO made it clear that
"IOSCO is not by means of this paper seeking to endorse the
111. Licht, supra note 4, at 128.
112. See Zaring, supra note 110, at 295.
113. See Joseph J. Norton, 'International Financial Law," An Increasingly Im-
portant Component of "International Economic Law:" A Tribute to Professor John
H. Jackson, 20 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 133, 141 (1999).
114. See Zaring, supra note 110, at 295. For a different interpretation of the
EU's adoption of the CAD, see Barbara Matthews, Capital Adequacy, Netting and
Derivatives, 2 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 167 (1995).
In 1988, two countries devised an approach to capital adequacy for which
they sought international acceptance through the BASLE Committee
process. By [the] early 1990s however, BASLE Committee members began
seeking to conclude the debate (and/or strengthen their bargaining posi-
tion) by issuing potentially preemptive national legal rules prior to the
development by the BASLE Committee of an international consensus. For
example, because EU member states comprise the majority of votes on
the BASLE Committee, agreement within the EU before the agreement
in BASLE could shape the substance and structure of internationally
agreed bank supervision rules that will likely be implemented widely
both within and outside the EU. In contrast, the individual states of the
U.S. do not participate and vote in the BASLE Committee. In this man-
ner, the BASLE process may provide the EU with the impetus to move
quickly on the issue in order to simultaneously increase EU bargaining
power and to decrease EU member state flexibility in BASLE. The pre-
emption occurred in March 1993, when the EU promulgated the capital
adequacy directive which issued final capital adequacy rules for market
risks incurred by banks and other financial institutions through their
trading activities.
Id. at 188.
115. International Organization of Securities Commissions, Recognising a Firm's
Internal Market Risk Model for the Purposes of Calculating Required Regulatory
Capital: Guidance to Supervisors § I (May 1999) <http://www.iosco.org/docs-pub-
licdownload_1999-market.risklmodel.html> [hereinafter IOSCO].
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particular standards laid down in BASLE and CAD II.Vu
D. SEC Concept Release, Net Capital Rule & OTC Derivatives
Dealers
In the SEC's concept release, Net Capital Rule, the SEC
announced proposed amendments to the Net Capital Rule." 7
First, the SEC proposed modifying the current haircut ap-
proach to incorporate the use of VAR models for interest bear-
ing instruments to allow for the correlations and hedges in a
firm's fixed income portfolio.'18 The proposed amendments
are intended to "better match capital charges with actual mar-
ket risk hedging practices employed by broker-dealers."'
Second, the SEC proposed to relax margin requirements and to
adopt the VAR approach to capital adequacy for OTC Deriva-
tives Dealers. 2 ' The SEC eventually passed the OTC Deriva-
tives Dealers rule, hoping to encourage broker-dealers to regis-
ter as derivatives dealers under 15(b) of the Exchange Act.' 2'
However, the SEC has not promulgated a rule to amend the
capital requirements for interest bearing instruments or equi-
ties.
The OTC Derivatives Dealers rule allows for "a form of
limited broker-dealer regulation that would give firms an op-
116. Id.
117. See Net Capital Rule, supra note 95.
118. See id. at 12, 14-17. In December 1997, the SEC proposed to adopt a
standard similar to the BIS building block method to calculate capital for market
risk on interest bearing instruments.
The amendments proposed in this release would change the haircuts
applicable to most interest rate instruments held in a broker-dealer's
proprietary account. The proposed amendments are on Banking Supervi-
sion in its amendments to the BASLE Capital Accord for market risk
arising from interest rate products. The Proposed Amendments would
treat most types of interest rate products as part of a single portfolio.
Under the Proposed Amendments, the net capital rule would recognize
various hedges among a portfolio of government securities, investment
grade non convertible debt securities, pass through Mortgage Backed
Securities, repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements. The amend-
ments should better match capital charges with actual risk hedging prac-
tices employed by broker dealers.
Id. at 2-5.
119. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 108.
120. See Net Capital Rule, supra note 95.
i21. See SEC, Final Rule, OTC Derivatives Dealers, Re]. 34-40594 (Oct. 23,
1998) (amending 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 240, 249) (visited Jan. 27, 2000)
<http:lwww.sec.gov/rules/finaY34-40594.htm> [hereinafter Final Rule].
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portunity to conduct business in a vehicle subject to modified
regulation appropriate to the OTC derivatives market."'22
The new rule went into effect on January 4, 1999." The SEC
adopted "rules and rule amendments that will allow U.S. secu-
rities firms to establish separately capitalized entities that
may engage in dealer activities in eligible OTC derivative in-
struments, which include both securities and non-securities
OTC derivative instruments."" These margin requirements
allow securities firms to be authorized by the Commission to
use VAR models"2 to calculate capital charges for market
risk. 6 An OTC Derivatives Dealer's VAR model must "meet
certain qualitative and quantitative requirements" currently
followed by the U.S. banking agencies."'
With this new rule, the SEC acknowledged the effects of
excessive regulation in a competitive global marketplace. OTC
derivatives are mobile and profitable.2 ' Rather than deriva-
tives dealers enduring the stringent Net Capital Rule, firms
have divided "their activities, placing non-securities activities
in separate, unregistered affiliates located in the United
States, and conducting their securities activities abroad." '29
In a GAO study, industry officials also commented that the
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. The minimum capital requirement for OTC derivatives dealers is tentative
net capital of $100 million and net capital of at least $20 million. See SEC, OTC
Derivatives Dealers: Correction, 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 240, 249; Net Capital Require-
ments (visited Jan. 27, 2000) <http/www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-40595.htm.>.
An OTC derivative dealer's VAR model must meet certain qualitative and
quantitative requirements under Appendix F that parallel rules currently
followed by U.S. banking agencies. To meet the qualitative requirements,
among other things, an OTC derivatives dealer must integrate its VAR
model into the firm's daily risk management process, and subject its VAR
model to stress tests, internal and external audits, and back testing. The
quantitative requirements contain statistical parameters for VAR mea-
sures using a time horizon that is appropriate in the regulatory capital
context, as well as risk factors that must be addressed in any model
used. These parameters include the use of a ten-day holding period and
a 99% confidence level.
Id. (emphasis added).
127. Final Rule, supra note 121, at 12.
128. See Over the Counter Derivatives Market Before the Senate Comm. on Agri-
culture, Nutrition and Forestry, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Arthur Levitt,
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
129. Id.
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Net Capital Rule "constrains business decisions" and forces
some institutions to conduct derivatives businesses "in unregu-
lated entities due to the high haircuts imposed by the Net
Capital Rule."3 ' The SEC conceded that "fragmenting a
firm's OTC derivatives business in this manner may hinder its
ability to manage risk and compete for business."13' The Se-
curities Industry Association (SIA)'warmly embraced the
changes to the Net Capital Rule as "a major step by recogniz-
ing that reform was needed to make U.S. firms competitive in
this important market segment."'32 The SEC also acknowl-
edged the influence of IOSCO in its decision to change capital
requirements from the Net Capital Rule to the VAR approach
used by BASLE and the FRB.'33
On November 12, 1999, Congress also passed the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, Financial Modernization Act of 1999 (FMA)
to "enhance competition in the financial services industry."
The bill allows "banks and securities firms to affiliate through
a 'financial holding company' structure-the Federal Reserve
will serve as the so-called 'umbrella' regulator, but the affili-
ates will be subject to functional regulation."" 5 In addition,
banks that meet certain requirements (i.e., well managed, well
capitalized) will be able to establish "a new type of bank sub-
sidiary to engage in securities underwriting."3 ' This new
bank subsidiary will be able to engage in "activities that are
financial in nature" as provided by the Secretary of the Trea-
sury. ' In addition, the FRB will "apply capital and manage-
rial standards comparable to those pertaining to U.S. banking
130. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 69.
131. Final Rule, supra note 121, at 6.
132. Derivative Regulation: SIA Welcomes SECs Rule Changes Regarding OTC
Derivatives Dealers, SEC. WK., Oct. 26, 1998, at 10, available in LEXIS, News
Group File, Securities Week. See also Katherine M. Reynolds, SLA likes 'Broker-
Dealer Light,' Range of Other SEC Innovations, BOND BUYER, Jan. 26, 1998, at 31,
available in LEXIS, News Group File, Bond Buyer.
133. See Final Rule, supra note 121 (amendment to rule 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-
1, reasons for allowing OTC Derivatives Dealers to use Value at Risk Models).
134. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, supra note 3.
135. Norman S. Johnson, Securities Regulation After Glass-Steagall Reform
(visited Mar. 3, 2000) <http:/wwww.sec.gov.news.speeches/spch353.htm>.
136. Id.
137. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, supra note 3.
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organizations."' In response to the new statute, some com-
mentators have "questioned whether independent securities
firms can survive in this environment."13 9
While the SEC's OTC Derivatives Dealers rule suggests
that there may be hope for the harmonization of capital ade-
quacy rules between U.S. and EU securities firms in the fu-
ture, U.S. broker-dealers' activities (not subject to the OTC
Derivatives Dealers option) are still subject to the Net Capital
Rule. 40 By adhering to BASLE's internal model methodology
which requires less capital than the Net Capital Rule, EU
securities firms and banks and U.S. banks maintain an unfair
advantage of additional capital for proprietary trading, under-
writing activities and derivatives transactions. Since the FMA
will allow U.S. and foreign banks to participate in underwrit-
ing securities, U.S. securities firms will face additional pres-
sure. In addition, the OTC Derivatives Dealers rule only pro-
vides broker-dealers with the "option" to register derivative
subsidiaries with the Commission under 15(b)."4 Therefore,
U.S. broker-dealers may still maintain separately capitalized
entities off shore to conduct derivatives activities beyond the
purview of regulators. Finally, without global capital adequacy
standards for securities firms, the world financial system re-
mains exposed to the systemic risk created by undercapitalized
brokerage firms.
II. THE GOALS OF HARMONIZING CAPITAL ADEQUACY
STANDARDS
There are two arguments in support of harmonization of
capital adequacy standards. One, given the dynamic nature of
contemporary capital markets, uniform capital adequacy acts
as a preventive measure against systemic risk. Second, securi-
ties regulators must seek to achieve the appropriate balance
between responsible regulation and fair competition. Capital
adequacy must be in place to protect investors and prevent the
"race to the bottom," but the regulation must not be so obtru-
138. Roger W. Ferguson, Remarks at the Institute of International Bankers
(visited Mar. 6, 2000) <http://www.federalreserve.gov/board-
docs/speechesl2000/200003062.htm>.
139. Johnson, supra note 135.
140. See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 16, at 266.
141. See Final Rule, supra note 121.
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sive as to prevent securities firms from competing with other
jurisdictions and other financial institutions within their own
jurisdiction.
A. Preventing Systemic Risk
Systemic risk is the risk that one party's inability to meet
its obligations could cause a domino effect amongst other par-
ties, causing the other parties to default on their obliga-
tions.' Systemic risks arise because "enhanced linkages
across national and international financial markets increase
the volatility of capital flows," thus creating the "potential for
concentrated disturbances." Therefore, the entire financial
system becomes exposed to the losses of one financial conglom-
erate.' These losses may emerge initially in firms, domestic
financial markets, international financial markets or the global
economy.'45 Therefore, a principal reason to harmonize capi-
tal adequacy is to prevent a "global financial meltdown by
minimizing systemic risks."46
Recent world events provide various examples of "global
financial meltdowns." The Mexican liquidity crisis destabilized
world markets from December 1994 through February
1995.'4 Unsound bank lending activities and widespread
market losses "contributed to bank difficulties and currency
devaluation" throughout Asia in 1997. " 8 As Asian markets
collapsed in October 1997, the effects reached the U.S. stock
market which "suffered its most severe single day point decline
in history, triggering circuit breakers and shutting down the
New York Stock Exchange." Another recent example is the
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis, triggered in
part by the Russian bond default. Federal banking regulators
142. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, More Than Just "New Financial Bingo": A Risk
Based Approach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 47 (1998) (citing
THE BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTER-
BANK NETrING SCHEMES OF THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES (1990)).
143. Norton, supra note 113, at 141.
144. See Lee Lawrence, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening Inter-
national Banking Supervision, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1998).
145. See id.
146. Worth, supra note 40.
147. See id.
148. Phillips & Rechtschaffen, supra note 47, at 1755.
149. Id.
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assisted in the private rescue of the hedge fund "to avoid the
distortions to market processes" created by "a fire-sale liquida-
tion and the consequent spreading of those distortions."50
These distortions would have been created by the closing out of
"hundreds of billions of dollars in transactions," moving mar-
kets, and an inability to "liquidate collateral or establish offset-
ting positions at the previously existing prices." 5' These
events could have generated several billion dollars of losses by
LTCM's seventy five counterparties.' 2
These examples of the "interdependence and volatility of
securities markets" provide a compelling argument for why
"adequate prudential supervision of securities dealers active in
the international financial markets" is as critical as the "pru-
dential supervision of the credit and transaction risks under-
taken by international banks."'53 Thus, market losses created
by the emerging economies debt crisis or other market distur-
bances may create large losses in brokerage firms, potentially
jeopardizing investor funds. Japan, one of the world's leading
capital markets, provides an example of large scale brokerage
failures. In early 1997, Japan's fourth largest brokerage firm,
Yamiachi Securities, and its seventh largest broker, Sanyo
Securities, closed due to large losses.'54 These recent events
certainly create an incentive to strengthen international bro-
150. Private Sector Refinancing of a Large Hedge Fund, Long Term Capital
Management Before the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv., 105th Cong.
(1998) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve). Or as a Wall
Street Journal article describes systemic risk, "[olne of the hotly debated issues at
the meeting was whether a collapse of Long Term Capital would put the entire
financial system at risk." Anita Raghaven & Mitchell Pacelle, To The Rescue? A
Hedge Fund Falters, So the Fed Persuades Big Banks to Ante Up, Firms to Lend
$3.6 billion As Long Term Capital Loses on its Bond Bets, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24,
1998, at Al.
151. Private Sector Refinancing of a Large Hedge Fund, Long Term Capital
Management Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 105th
Cong. (1998) (testimony of William J. McDonough, President, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York).
152. See id.
153. Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, International Standards for Consolidated Super-
vision of Financial Conglomerates: Controlling Systemic Risk, 19 BROOK. J. INTL L.
137, 138-39 (1993) (citing an OECD report published in 1991 "Systemic Risks in
Securities Markets").
154. See World of Information, Asia-Japan, Review 1999, FT ASIA INTELLIGENCE
WIRE, Jan. 1, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, FT Asia Intelligence Wire;
see also Sanyo Bankruptcy Raises Fears Over Japanese Markets; Brokerage House
Collapses Amid Fears of Wider Instability, CORP. MONEY, Nov. 5, 1997, at 1.
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kerage firms' capital base and increase their ability to with-
stand such market turmoil.
B. Achieving a Balance Between Responsible Regulation and
Fair Competition
Without global capital adequacy standards for securities
firms, brokers in search of new markets will migrate to coun-
tries with less developed, unsafe or unenforced regulatory
standards, "thereby damaging the safety and soundness of
financial markets."'55 Regulators fear that regulatory compe-
tition could amount to "a race to the bottom" and "reduce secu-
rities regulation to a point where investors do not receive effec-
tive protection."'56 An example of such danger is Japan's re-
cent actions within its securities industry. Japan's current
securities regulatory regime has presented a danger to foreign
securities firms.5 7 Foreign brokers expressed concern over
joining a fund to protect the industry from brokerage failures
"because it does not require brokers to segregate client assets
from brokerage assets."'58 Smaller Japanese brokerage hous-
es have "long used assets held on behalf of their clients as
working capital," thus foreign brokers are "concerned with
expenditures to pay for losses incurred by the smaller broker-
age firms."'59 A global standard for computing regulatory cap-
ital for securities firms would prevent such reliance on custom-
er funds. 6 '
In addition, the continued "regulatory attempts to main-
tain segmented regulation between international banks and
155. Zaring, supra note 110, at 283.
156. Id.
157. See 6 Bil. Yen Protection Fund Eyed by Foreign Brokers, JAPAN WEEKLY
MoNITOR, Nov. 16, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Japan Weekly Moni-
tor.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. If there were such a standard, perhaps, Japan would feel pressured to
follow it. One newspaper account reported how banks were "struggling" to meet
international capital adequacy rules. See Grant Ringshaw, Sayonara, The Global
Expansion of Japan's Banks and Investment House is in Rapid Reverse, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (LoNDoN), Nov. 1, 1998, at 5. Therefore, for some banks "remaining an
international operator" was no longer an option. Id. "All international banks must
have capital adequacy ratio of 8 percent under Bank of International Settlement's
rules. But Japan only demands 4 percent capital adequacy ratio for domestic
banks." Id.
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securities firms" will only shift activities to "more favorable
jurisdictions" where it is cheaper to conduct business.'' The
SEC's Net Capital Rule "impacts heavily on U.S. broker-deal-
ers because they cannot easily hold securities."62 The Net
Capital Rule "writes down such investments to a fraction of
their market value."63 The rule also restricts the entrance
into the securities industry by imposing high minimum capital
requirements on broker dealers.' However, the SEC recent-
ly acknowledged the costs of the lack of global harmonization
of capital standards. Therefore, the SEC has begun to acknowl-
edge that the "unilateral approach" may have some unintended
anti-competitive results. Thus, as capital markets continue to
innovate by creating new financial instruments, global har-
monization may be the only alternative to maintaining compet-
itive capital markets (within the purview of the SEC, of course)
in the United States. Furthermore, a change in the Net Capi-
tal Rule would promote capital formation by reducing capital
charges for well hedged portfolios and by better reflecting the
hedging strategies actually used by broker-dealers.'65 This
should allow broker-dealers greater freedom to invest assets or
support underwritings, thereby promoting capital forma-
tion."'66 In addition, the new financial structures allowed by
the FMA will present a challenge to the survival of indepen-
dent securities firms who have higher capital requirements
than their banking competitors. SEC Commissioner Norman S.
Johnson conceded that some firms "may try to move different
business segments to benefit from what they would regard as a
more favorable regulatory environment." 7 Although such a
"business strategy" may be "unfortunate," it may certainly
occur.1
6 8
Finally, countries such as Japan maintain separate bank-
ing and securities regulation, therefore, firms may "go unregu-
lated in a country with only a banking regulator" where the
161. Norton, supra note 113, at 143.
162. JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 97, at 692.
163. Id
164. See id.
165. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 108 (discussing SEC, Proposed Rule,
Net Capital Rule, Rel. No. 34-39455, at 34 (Dec. 17, 1997).
166. See id.
167. Johnson, supra note 135.
168. Id.
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regulator assumes that the home regulator will regulate the
securities activities.'69 Therefore, uniform capital require-
ments for all securities firms would prevent such omission by
regulators and would insure consistent and responsible capital
adequacy.
A global capital adequacy standard remains necessary to
avoid systemic risk. As recently demonstrated by various Japa-
nese brokerage failures, the Asian currency crisis and LTCM,
such events have a large impact on the world economy. Uni-
form capital adequacy rules for securities firms will protect in-
vestors and also promote fair competition between countries.
As encouraged by the SIA, changes such as these are necessary
to keep the U.S. competitive in the global capital markets.'
III. HARMONIZATION MAY BE ACHIEVED BY IMPLEMENTING THE
VAR APPROACH BY ADOPTING BASLE's INTERNAL MODEL
METHODOLOGY
BASLE's internal model methodology may act as a protec-
tive measure against systemic risk, prevent global regulatory
arbitrage and promote fair competition. The internal model
methodology presents an improvement over the inflexibility of
the standardized methodology and does not require the exces-
sive capital demanded by the comprehensive approach. Due to
enforcement issues, the PCA does not present a viable alterna-
tive for global securities regulators. Therefore, the internal
model methodology should be adopted by securities regulators
to achieve global harmonization of capital adequacy rules.
The internal model methodology presents an improvement
over the comprehensive approach. As opposed to the compre-
hensive approach, the internal, model methodology recognizes
the risk management benefits of hedging and portfolio diversi-
fication. As conceded by the SEC, the comprehensive approach
overcompensates for market risk, often adversely affecting a
securities firm's ability to compete. The internal model method-
ology would free up capital for securities firms to be used for
trading and underwriting securities. By adopting the internal
model approach, a level playing field would be created for U.S.
securities firms.
169. Worth, supra note 40.
170. See sources cited supra note 132.
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The internal model methodology also presents an improve-
ment over the standardized methodology. First, the internal
model methodology may be used for derivatives because it does
not rely on notional values and accounts for netting arrange-
ments. While the building block approach fostered concerns for
its inaccurate estimates, the internal model methodology has
received favorable results as a risk management tool in a
BASLE study during the very volatile final two quarters of
1998.7 The study revealed that the "market risk capital
charge provided an adequate buffer against trading losses over
this period" and "none of the institutions surveyed reported
trading losses over any ten-day consecutive period that exceed-
ed the capital requirement in force at the start of the peri-
od."172 Therefore, the internal model methodology appears to
have met the critical risk management purpose: the accurate
calculation of necessary capital.
In addition, the internal model methodology presents a
more flexible approach than the standardized methodology.
The use of the internal model methodology for risk manage-
ment recognizes that "no single or specific technique is best for
171. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Performance of Mod-
els-Based Capital Charges for Market Risk, 1 July-31 December 1998 (visited Oct.
26, 1999) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs57.htm.>.
The survey compared daily trading losses to the capital charge for mar-
ket risk calculated under the internal model approach, and to banks'
99th percentile value-at-risk (VaR) estimate calculated for a one-day hold-
ing period; the latter measure is the basis for the Amendment's
backtesting procedures. The capital charge is calculated based on the
99th percentile VaR estimate, calculated over a 10-day holding period,
and the supervisory multiplier (a number of three or higher). The capital
charge would be expressed as the higher of (a) the previous day's VaR
measure, calculated based on the above parameters, or (b) the average of
the daily VaR measures during the preceding sixty business days, times
the multiplier. The Amendments backtesting framework involves calcu-
lating the number of times over the prior 250 business days that ob-
served daily trading losses exceed the bank's one-day, 99% confidence
level VaR estimate (so-called "exceptions"). The Amendment directly re-
lates the size of the supervisory multiplier used to calculate the capital
charge to the number of exceptions observed in the last of 250 business
days. The survey results suggest that the market risk capital charge
provided an adequate buffer against trading losses over this period. In
particular, none of the institutions surveyed reported trading losses over
any ten-day consecutive period that exceeded the capital requirement in
force at the start of the period.
Id. (citations omitted).
172. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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everyone."73 Banks criticized the standardized approach for
not allowing an organization to tailor its risk management to
its unique qualities and needs. The internal model methodolo-
gy allows each institution to tailor its risk management to its
unique operations, structure and history.7 4 The internal
model methodology also allows for "a range of compatible re-
sponses to similar situations" that encourage "experimentation,
innovation, and growth." 75 By allowing the actual risk takers
armed with detailed proprietary information to produce the
internal models, more accurate models may be created to man-
age the industry's market risk. Furthermore, it is the Federal
Reserve Chairman's view that "no matter how complex capital
requirements become, firms will develop new products to ex-
ploit the remaining inevitable distortions in the regulations to
lower their capital requirements."76 Therefore, it makes
sense to encourage firms to continue to improve risk manage-
ment methods rather than to require regulators to catch up
with the institution's technology.
While the PCA provides an ostensible solution to concerns
that the 3x multiplier will eliminate any incentive for banks to
create accurate models, the PCA should not be considered for
global capital adequacy standards for securities firms. 7 ' Crit-
ics of the internal model methodology argue that the PCA
provides a stronger incentive (for banks) because the PCA
"could lower the bank's pre-committed capital requirement and
not increase the risk of paying a penalty."' Such an ap-
proach should not be considered on an international basis.
Currently, no international financial regulator exists'to enforce
a monetary penalty on private actors or to oversee the activi-
ties of national regulators who would be enforcing the mone-
tary fines. In difficult economic times, a fine enforced by a
national regulator would be interpreted as counterproductive
to national economic initiatives. Therefore, regulators would
173. Phillips & Rechtschaffen, supra note 47, at 1757.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 99.
177. See Kupiec & O'Brien, supra note 23, at 3. The PCA should be addressed
since the SEC mentioned a modified pre-commitment feature in its Net Capital
Rule concept release. Net Capital Rule, supra note 95, at 18.
178. Governor Laurence H. Meyer, Address Before the Spring 1998 Banking
and Finance Lecture, Widener University, Chester, Pennsylvania (Apr. 16, 1998).
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have a difficult time enforcing such measures. In addition,
each fine must be developed to provide an adequate deterrent
to future violations of the capital adequacy rules. Thus, each
fine would have to be tailored to address the unique character-
istics of the institution. Without international enforcement or
oversight, it would be impossible to insure fairness and consis-
tency of the fines. Furthermore, systemic risk remains a key
argument for global regulatory convergence. A failing institu-
tion may be encouraged to take its chances with remaining
capital to bet on the market if it had the ability to make such
decisions for capital adequacy. In addition, imposing a penalty
after the bankruptcy of a securities firm would only increase
the market disruption and losses to creditors, investors or
counterparties. For securities regulators, the focus should be to
prevent such events from occurring.
Even though critics of the internal model methodology
complain that the 3x multiplier leads to excessive capital,
arguments may be made that the multiplier safeguards against
"unavoidable shortcomings" of this approach.'79 First, the
multiplier gives additional capital to protect against "extreme
circumstancets such as sharp market moves or credit quality
deterioration in a whole geographical region."180 Second, the
multiplier gives additional capital against "those risks which
are not included in the calculation at all, notably, operational
risk."8' Therefore, until the technology evolves to overcome
these shortcomings, a multiplier or some type of cushion to the
VAR will be necessary.
By selecting the internal model methodology, the chances
of attaining a uniform capital adequacy standard would be
improved. Such measures have already been implemented by
EU financial firms, U.S. banks and, eventually, U.S. OTC
Derivatives Dealers. Therefore, the campaign to adopt the
internal model methodology already has influential and vocal
supporters. Finally, the world capital markets would have
achieved another system of defense against systemic risk and
brokerage failures.
With regulators carefully reviewing the internal model,
179. See IOSCO, supra note 115.
180. Id. at 11.
181. Id.
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back testing the model's results and strictly enforcing the
quantitative and qualitative standards, securities firms will
have adequate incentive to implement the internal model
methodology. Should securities firms fail to adhere to the capi-
tal adequacy standards, the regulatoris could impose the strict-
er of the two:, the building block approach or the former ap-
proach used in their national jurisdiction. Furthermore, while
some industry officials may be unsatisfied with the 3x multipli-
er as the solution to the limitations of risk management model-
ing, perhaps this perceived deficiency would present an incen-
tive to improve technology to eventually capture unusual mar-
ket swings and operational risks.
CONCLUSION
As financial firms become more diverse and global, regula-
tors have to "catch up' with modern international financial
market developments." 8' This regulatory "catch up" will be-
come urgent for the SEC with the enactment of the FMA. In
addition, regulatory "catch up" to implement global capital ade-
quacy standards for securities firms will be critical so securi-
ties regulators may fulfill their key mantras: protect investors,
protect fair competition and promote an efficient market.
Elene Spanakos
182. Norton, supra note 113, at 142.
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